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In a decentralised system like P2P where each individual peers are considerably au-
tonomous, the notion of mutual trust between peers is critical. In addition, when the
environment is subject to inherent resource constraints, any eﬃciency efforts are essen-
tially needed. In light of these two issues, we propose a novel trustworthy-based eﬃcient
broadcast scheme in a resource-constrained P2P environment. The trustworthiness is asso-
ciated with the peer’s reputation. A peer holds a personalised view of reputation towards
other peers in four categories namely SpEed, Correctness, qUality, and Risk-freE (SeCuRE).
The value of each category constitutes a fraction of the reliability of individual peer. An-
other factor that contributes to the reliability of a peer is the peer’s credibility concerning
trustworthiness in providing recommendation about other peers. Our trust management
scheme is applied in conjunction with our trust model in order to detect malicious and
collaborative-based malicious peers. Knowledge of trustworthiness among peers is used in
our proposed broadcast model named trustworthy-based estafet multi-point relays (TEMPR).
This model is designed to minimise the communication overhead between peers while
considering the trustworthiness of the peers such that only trustworthy peer may relay
messages to other peers. With our approach, each peer is able to disseminate messages in
the most eﬃcient and reliable manner.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems have been growing enormously in the last few years. It gradually evolves from a simple ﬁle-
sharing to IP telephony, video and other media content applications through a variety of web-based platforms. As opposed to
the traditional client-server model, the P2P system offers some notable beneﬁts including scalability, adaptability, decreased
operational costs and the aggregation of idle resources [1]. The entities or nodes in the P2P system are typically independent
and autonomous. Additionally, the P2P network does not have a central authority. Thus, not only that this system is largely
dependent on the voluntary resource contribution from the individual nodes but also the presence of malicious behaviours
among peers must be managed among themselves in the network. Consequently, security threat is the most signiﬁcant issue
therein. This issue is considered as a wide security issue within P2P environments, hence a modelling concept like trust and
reputation are essentially important for security purposes and gaining conﬁdence among inter-operating entities.
* Corresponding author. Fax: +61 3 9905 5159.
E-mail addresses: david.taniar@monash.edu, dtaniar@gmail.com (D. Taniar).0022-0000/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jcss.2011.10.019
A.B. Waluyo et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 78 (2012) 1716–1736 1717Fig. 1. Interactive peer’s identiﬁer.
There are a variety of interactions occurring in P2P system for different kind of applications [34,37]. These interac-
tions can be classiﬁed into two types of communications namely pull-interaction and push-interaction. Similar to the
publish/subscribe paradigm [13], the pull-interaction relates to the request interaction whereby one peer sends a request to
other peer for services or carrying out task [35,36]. Push-interaction corresponds to the peer who disseminates message to a
group of other peers. Our proposed approach considers these two types of interactions. The reputation value gathered from
the pull-interaction or received from other peers is used to serve the push-interaction for ensuring that only trustworthy
peers forward the message. Subsequently, our TEMPR scheme, which is designed to broadcast messages among neighbour-
hood peers, is deployed as a means to enhance the eﬃciency of the push-interaction. There is a deﬁned network policy
revolving around these two interactions that we put in place to ensure the sustainability of the network. The proliferation
of mobile and wireless ad hoc communication technology has led to the pervasive deployment of computing devices [20].
This phenomenon offers additional attractions in P2P computing research. This paper is particularly concerned with reliable
and eﬃcient data dissemination in resource-constrained P2P wireless network. Such resource-constraints include short-life
batteries, limited storage restriction, frequency of disconnection, narrow bandwidth capacity, handover latency, and asym-
metric communications costs and bandwidth [12,16,17,30,33].
The peers in the network can be classiﬁed based on their past and current interaction experiences. Based on past inter-
actions, peers can be considered as direct peers or indirect peers. Direct peers are peers who have had direct interaction
with each other in order to satisfy certain objectives. Indirect peers are peers that have not had any mutual interactions.
For current interaction especially in the querying context (i.e. reputation, object, task, etc.), the peers can be classiﬁed as
querying peer or queried peer. Querying peer is a peer who is sending a request to another peer, and queried peer is a peer
that is being requested by the querying peer. There are two scenarios involved. First, the querying peer sends the query di-
rectly to the queried peer. This case normally relates to query other than reputation query. Second, the querying peer sends
the query concerning the queried peer to an intermediate peer. There is direct-intermediate peer that is a peer who is
able to commend the queried peer reputation or forward the query to a trustworthy peer based on its direct interaction
experience. However, not every peer has direct interaction with the queried peer and knows about the trustworthiness of
the reputation queried peer. Typically, if a peer is not able to commend the trustworthiness of a queried peer, it passes the
query to other peers to whom it feels may be able to satisfy the query or know the trustworthiness of the queried peer
and these peers are called indirect-intermediate peers. Fig. 1 illustrates the relationship of peers in the two contexts. These
terms will be used when deﬁning our trust model in the later section.
1.1. Scope and contributions
In this paper, each mobile peer is able to communicate with other peers within its wireless range. The range normally
relates to a short-range ad hoc network with IEEE 802.11x (i.e. Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11x wireless network). We consider
the scenario whereby the mobile peers are infrequently moving. For example in the oﬃce or cafe setting, a peer may
interconnect with other peer and broadcasts a message to a group of peers (i.e. to notify a meeting date or to alert other
peers of an interesting event). The movement becomes an additional parameter which we leave it as part of our future
work.
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This paper aims to present a novel trustworthy-based eﬃcient broadcast scheme for wireless P2P interactions whereby
the environment is subject to ﬁnite resources (i.e. lightweight terminals and limited power and bandwidth). As part of
deﬁning the reputation level, the proposed model adopts a personalised approach. The personalised model comprises four
different categories of trust, namely: SpEed, Correctness qUality, and Risk-freE (SeCuRE). The value of each category con-
stitutes a fraction of the reliability of the individual peer. Together with the peer’s credibility in providing feedback about
other peers, an overall reputation score can be obtained.
Different peers may have different view when deﬁning trust. Hence, a personalised trust will help peers to make a
better informed decision according to the context of their interactions. The reputation knowledge of each peer is used in
our proposed trustworthy-based estafet multi-point relays for message dissemination. This proposed approach is designed
to enhance the eﬃciency of data dissemination among peers while considering the trustworthiness of peers such that
only trustworthy peer can forward the messages. As a matter of fact, data transmission requires substantially larger power
utilisations than computational operations in the order of magnitude [12,16], it is therefore important to minimise the
communication cost especially when the associated device peers are built and operated with limited resources [17,18].
Overall, the contributions of this paper are: (i) introducing a novel trust and reputation model; (ii) deﬁning a trust man-
agement scheme; (iii) designing a new trustworthy-based multi-point relay model for data dissemination; and (iv) carrying
out experimental studies of the proposed models and comparing the performance results with the most relevant existing
methods.
1.2. Outline of the paper
The rest of the sections in this paper are organised as follows. Section 2 presents prior state of the arts of data dissemina-
tion and trust model in P2P networks. Section 3 describes our proposed SeCuRE personalised trust model and management
scheme. It is then followed by the proposed multi-point relaying scheme (TEMPR) in Section 4. Section 5 studies the eﬃ-
ciency performance of the proposed TEMPR scheme and the precision analysis of the trust model for identifying peers as
compared to the existing methods. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Prior art
This paper is associated with resource-constrained P2P networks, and the proposed framework is made up of two uni-
ﬁed elements, namely: (i) data dissemination, and (ii) trustworthiness. The following outlines the state-of-the-art in each
element of the framework followed by a tabular form to highlight the stand point of this paper in respect to the existing
works.
2.1. Data dissemination in P2P network
In a P2P network, each peer normally can only send a message to its neighbour peers [10,11,31]. One approach of
broadcasting a message is that a peer ﬁrst sends a message to every neighbour peers. On receipt of a message, the neighbour
peers forward the message to the second level neighbour peers. This is called a pure ﬂooding scheme [9,35]. However, the
pure ﬂooding scheme implies the huge network overhead due to the message redundancies. An example of pure ﬂood
approach is illustrated in Fig. 2(a). In Fig. 2(a), the broadcasting peer in the middle sends a message to all of its neighbour
peers, which are then forwarded to all of second neighbour peers or leaf peers in this case without any speciﬁc regulation.
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of the values. A collection of ﬁrst and second level neighbour peers is shown as N1(pb), and N2(pb), respectively. The child
peers of pb is denoted by C(pb). R(pb) indicates a set of relay peers selected from N1(pb) obtained by the MPR algorithm.
L(pb) is a set of leaf peers of pb . Here, C(pb) = R(pb)∪ L(pb) and R(pb)∩ L(pb) = ∅. As shown in Fig. 2(b), the peer coloured
in black is the broadcasting peer (pb) and the one with grid pattern is the relay peers, R(pb), while the leaf peers are those
with pure white colour. The two peers with cross pattern are part of the neighbour peers, N1(pb) that are not selected as
the relay peers, R(pb). Peers, who are chosen as a relay peer, play a critical role in the push-interaction process. If a relay
peer pi is faulty, every sub-network peer under pi is not able to receive messages. Consequently, it is necessary to ensure
that only the trustworthy peer is responsible to broadcast messages. Supposedly the second neighbour peer pk in N2(pb)
has multiple ﬁrst neighbour peers in N1(pb), which are parents of pk . A neighbour peer pi , which is the most trustworthy
one is then selected as the relay peer. The peer pi has the highest possibility to deliver a message to its sub-network,
S(pi). The overall idea is that every sub-network is covered by the most trustworthy relay peer. It depends on the overlay
topology among peers how many number of relay peers are required to cover all the peers in a sub-network. The only
existing trustworthy-based broadcast scheme (TBB) that has been reported in [6,27] adopts the concept of MPR scheme subject
to the condition that only trustworthy peers can become a relay peer. The trustworthiness is determined based on the
past interactions of the successful transactions over unsuccessful ones. However, it does not address the trust management
aspect of the peers, which is particularly concerned with defamation or bad mouthing and collusion-based malicious peers.
Chen et al. [20] adopt the human strategies of ﬁnding answers through acquaintances, learning from experiences and
gossiping words in social networking for mobile P2P information retrieval. A method was investigated to evaluate the
distance from a query node to the resource node, which aims for the shortest route. This existing work is mainly concerned
with query dissemination and ﬁnding a way to obtain the result of the query eﬃciently. The nature of this existing work
differs from our paper in a sense that this existing work focused on getting the query result with the shortest possible hops,
whilst our aim in this paper is to disseminate messages to a group of peers in the most reliable and eﬃcient manner.
2.2. Trustworthiness in P2P network
In a typical case, each peer in P2P networks is interacting with many other possibly unknown or stranger peers. Con-
sequently, it is easy for a peer to be defrauded or disappointed. To address this, an effective trust and reputation model is
ultimately important to be put in place.
Traditional security schemes such as the public key infrastructure [14,15] are not always applicable in highly distributed
systems like P2P whereby entities may enter, leave and re-enter the network as they wish [2]. CuboidTrust [3] is a trust
model for P2P networks which considers three trust factors including contribution of a peer to the system by taking into
account experiences of all peers in the network, peer’s trustworthiness in reporting feedbacks and quality of resource. It
applies power iteration in order to compute the global trust value of each peer forming a reputation rank. However, this
model was mainly concerned with the authentic and inauthentic resource and the associated peers. It does not consider the
transmission factor, accuracy, and the validity in the model.
GossipTrust [22] proposed a gossip-based protocol for aggregating global reputation scores. The idea of this trust model is
to allow peers sharing weighted local trust scores with randomly selected neighbours until reaching some global consensus
on peer reputations.
PeerTrust [4] is a trust model, which is based on a transactional feedback system. It considers various elements such
as feedback that a peer receives from other peers, the total number of transactions a peer performs, the credibility of the
feedback sources, transaction context factor and the community context factor. It deﬁnes a general trust metric to combine
these parameters. However, these factors used in their trust model must be retrieved with a heavy overhead. Additionally,
it is not fully designed to distinguish and punish malicious peers.
Group-based negotiations method [23] was a protocol designed for peer group joining based on negotiations. The proto-
col is complemented by resource negotiation language that is able to support the speciﬁcation of a large variety of conditions
applying to single peers or groups of peers. However, this approach still suffers of some potential security issues that are
typical of trust negotiations such as malicious peers and collaborative-based malicious peers.
PowerTrust [24] leveraged the power-law distribution of peer feedbacks. It dynamically selects small number of power
nodes that are most reputable using a distributed ranking mechanism and use a look-ahead random walk strategy to im-
prove the global reputation accuracy. This approach relies heavily on the present of the power nodes.
Pseudo Trust [25] addresses the trade-off between trust and anonymity where each peer, instead of using its real identity,
generates an unforgeable and veriﬁable pseudonym using a one-way hash function. Zero-Knowledge Proof is designed so
that peers can be authenticated without leaking any sensitive information.
Peer-based monitoring approach [21] to detect malicious peer in P2P streaming has been proposed. This approach re-
quires each node to monitor the data received and to periodically send monitoring messages about its trustworthy neighbour
nodes. These trustworthy nodes are organised into a threaded binary tree in order to store and search messages among mul-
tiple nodes. However, this approach is not very optimised for resource-constrained environments.
Bio-inspired mechanisms (i.e. AntRep [5]) show some potential for measuring trust among peers in a high adaptability
and scalability environment such as P2P networks. However, in some cases, their approach may not always be effective by
mistakenly choosing a malicious peer as the most trustworthy one, and discarding another clearly benevolent peer.
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Comparison of data dissemination schemes in P2P networks.
Data dissemination schemes Message redundancies Overhead cost Trust model Trust management scheme
Scheduling cost Communication cost
Pureﬂooding [9] Yes Low High No No
MPR [9] No Medium Medium No No
TBB [6,27] No Medium Medium Conventional Conventional
TEMPR No Low Low New New
Fig. 3. Proposed trust model: Overall view.
Trustworthy-based broadcast scheme (TBB) [26] has adopted a conventional approach for determining trustworthiness
among peers. In this model, the knowledge of trustworthiness is derived from the neighbourhood peers and the decision
relies on the collective feedbacks of these peers. A similar approach has been applied for network trust management in
emergency situations [32] involving a hybrid of P2P and centralised architecture.
Each of these existing trust models has its own strength, but none of these have particularly considered trust model
and management with personalisation feature in a pure decentralised or unstructured mobile P2P network as what we
are going to address in this paper. Considering all of the above state-of-the-arts in data dissemination and trustworthiness
in P2P networks, we ﬁnd that pure ﬂooding, MPR, TBB as the closest works related to this paper. Thus, they will be used
extensively for performance analysis of the proposed TEMPR model. Table 1 shows a comparison of P2P data dissemination
methods.
3. P2P trustworthiness: Proposed framework
Our proposed Trustworthiness Framework consists of two components: (i) SeCuRE Trust Model, and (ii) SeCuRE Trust
Management Scheme. SeCuRE Trust Model determines how we assign value to the peer including the network policy to
ensure a stable network. This model will be applied in conjunction with our Trust Management Scheme, which aims to
detect bad mouthing peers or peers that discredit ‘good’ peers and promotes the ‘bad’ peers including the collaborative-
based malicious peers. This framework constitutes the basis for the pull and push interaction between peers in the network.
Fig. 3 shows an overview of the proposed framework.
3.1. SeCuRE: Trust model
Our proposed trust model is built with two important elements namely: (i) personalisation, and (ii) network policy.
A. Personalisation
We consider trust as a personal measure towards others. A peer’s trust on another peer may not be the same with
another peer’s trust towards the same peer. For example, peer A and peer C have had a direct interaction with peer B .
Let’s assume that the context of interactions between (peer A and peer B) and (peer B and peer C ) were the same. After
the interaction, peer A assigned a trustworthy value of 9 to peer B . In the opposite side, peer C assigned a trustworthiness
value of 4 to peer B , although peer B had given the same Quality of Service to peer A and peer C . In this case, if another
peer E is to ask the trustworthiness of peer B from peer A and C , peer E will receive different values. The reason of this
is that each peer perceives and assigns trust value based on their individual context, preference and priority. In this case, it
might be that peer A is much concerned with the bandwidth and transmission speed, while peer C is more on the quality
of the requested object. As peer B has a limited bandwidth, this peer can only accommodate the quality and sacriﬁce the
speed.
This follows the natural behaviour of the living organisms whereby an entity is trusted to carry out a well-specialised
task by another entity based on the fact that the trusted entity is known to be reliable and capable to complete the task
well [19]. For example, in the human ecosystem, a medical doctor is trusted by his/her peer to provide medications, but the
level of trust will not be the same when the doctor is assigned to solve problems of a broken car. Thus, the notion of trust
between peers cannot be generalised.
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Based on this, our proposed model is developed by looking into four areas of reputation namely SpEed, Correctness qUal-
ity, and Risk-freE (SeCuRE). Each querying peer will be able to obtain the trustworthy value of the queried peer from other
peers and choose the area that better ﬁts with their personal preference. SpEed (S) is a peer’s assessment on the trans-
mission quality like the latency of the requested object or resource to be received by the queried peer. This is particularly
important for peers that are mindful about time and less concerned about the quality. Correctness (C ) is a basic require-
ment to measure to accuracy or authenticity of the resource received from other peer. This is important as peers may be
sending incorrect or inauthentic resource intentionally or unintentionally, which may cause serious damages. qUality (Q ) is
a measure towards the quality of resource obtained from the queried peer. Media content resources (i.e. video and audio
ﬁles) are the main targets for this attribute. Lastly, the Risk-freE (R) is a measure for malicious resources received from
other peers. This malicious resource includes viruses, spywares, worms and so on [7].
Another aspect of trust, that is part of the model, is the peer’s credibility reputation. This credibility relates to the
peer’s reliability in providing recommendation towards other peers. Our trust model consists of two elements of reputation
namely the personalised reputation and credibility reputation. The former corresponds to a reliability measure of peers in
providing services, and the latter is a measure of a peer’s reliability in providing trust feedbacks. The integration of these
two elements represents the overall reputation of the peer in the network, which leads to the peer’s trustworthiness. A time
stamp is applied as a means to determine the validity of the model. Each peer may have a personal judgment on the validity
of the trust values. This time stamp helps peers to overcome changes of nodes behaviour over time, as it is common that
benevolent nodes may become malicious over time and vice versa [7]. Our model is based on the peer’s personal judgment
to identify immediately these changes and react accordingly. Fig. 4 illustrates the reputation elements in our trust model.
For simplicity, we set a uniform value ranging from 0–100 to specify the reputation score of each attribute; being 100
as the best and 0 as the worst. This range of value is also consistent with the existing model described in [2]. Furthermore,
this value can be represented in integer data type rather than ﬂoating point, which is considerably more eﬃcient in term
of storage/computational cost. The generic format of our reputation model can be described as follows:
• Service trustworthiness of peer i.
This model represents the service reputation (Ts) of peer i as viewed by other peers in the network, which can be
obtained through direct or indirect interactions. Each peer that has interacted with peer i will store the score of each
element within our model (S,C, Q , R), which is denoted in this format, [S,C, Q , R]tpi . It reads the trust value of peer i
in time t for each category. The aggregate value of these scores, which becomes the overall reputation services of peer i
regarded by its direct of indirect peers at time t is also stored, which can be deﬁned as follows:
[S,C, Q , R]tpi →
[∑
(SC Q R)/4
]t
pi
→ Tsi (1)
• Credibility trustworthiness of peer i.
Similar to the service reputation, the credibility trust of peer i regarded by its indirect or direct peers is stored accord-
ingly in [Cr]tpi . It signiﬁes the credibility of peer i for providing reliable recommendation in time t .
When the score changes, the new value with a new time stamp is also recorded accordingly.
[Cr]tpi → Tci . (2)
• Trustworthiness query.
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the query from peer x to peer y of the trustworthiness of peer i in every aspect of S , C , Q , and R over a period of time
(T ).
Qx→y[S,C, Q , R]Tpi (3)
Likewise, when peer x queries peer y over the credibility of peer i in a period of time can be represented as follows:
Qx→y[Cr]Tpi (4)
If there is no interaction history with the requested peer, a null value can be assigned.
• Respond to the trustworthiness/credibility query.
Following the service/credibility reputation query by peer x to peer y concerning peer i, peer y replies in the following
format. It may be possible that peer y has multiple records within the requested period due to multiple interactions. Hence,
peer y will send each score accordingly denoted by time t ∈ T .
Ry→x[S,C, Q , R]t∈Tpi (5)
Ry→x[Cr]t∈Tpi (6)
• Overall trustworthiness.
When multiple interactions exist, it is natural that each interaction engages in different context, and therefore each of
these requires a different assessment and so is the reputation value by the corresponding peer. The overall trustworthiness
of a peer can be represented by an aggregate trust value of the peer for all of the interactions that have occurred. The
following model determines the overall service and credibility trustworthiness of peer i in which M denotes the number of
interactions.{∑M
i=1[SC Q R/4]tpi
M
: t ∈ T
}
→ Tsi (7)
{∑M
i=1[Cr]tpi
M
: t ∈ T
}
→ Tci (8)
The combination of service and credibility reputation value of a peer i, Tsi ∪ Tci constitutes the overall score of a peer
trustworthiness, Toi :
avg(Tsi + Tci) → Toi (9)
The peer-to-peer communication in our case can always be represented by a tuple as shown above. As an example let
us identify two scenarios below:
Scenario 1: Let us assume that peer A has previously interacted with peer B . Peer C , as it does not have interaction history
with peer B , would like to ask peer A about peer B trustworthiness. Due to the nature of the application, peer C is mostly
concerned with the transmission speed, accuracy and risk. It looks for these particular attributes when choosing a peer. The
value of the reputation ranges from 1 to 100; being 100 as the most trustworthy value. The interactions can be shown as
follows:
Peer C sends a query to peer A requesting service reliability of peer B from January to May 2011 which is given as
follows.
Peer C to peer A: QC→A[S,C, Q , R]Jan.–May 2011pB
The respond from peer A to peer C on the query is denoted in the following:
Peer A to peer C : RA→C[90,100,60,100]Feb. 2011pB
Scenario 2: This case is similar to Scenario 1, except that peer C does not have a preference to interact with but it has
a strict requirement to follow. Hence, it seeks advice from peer A of any peers that it may know to have the requested
resource or object and is able to satisfy the criteria. The criteria are given in the query. Subsequently, peer A will check the
criteria and inform peers that are able to satisfy the criteria based on peer A’s records. The query can be represented as
follows:
QC→A[ 80,100, 50,100]Jan.–May 2011∀p∈P
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with different value may require different level of trust. For example, it is still possible for a peer to trust a high-risk supplier
for a low-valued $5 item purchase, but it may not be the same case for a high-valued $10,000 transaction. In our model,
we can accommodate this by further relaxing or tightening the restrictions.
Lemma 1. The SeCuRE trust model warrants less likelihood for a new peer to encounter malicious peers during interactions,
OpportunityToProbeIntoNon-TrustedPeer (SeCuRE) OpportunityToProbeIntoNon-TrustedPeer (conventional).
Proof. The conventional trust model recognises two categories of peers in the network namely, trustworthy and untrustwor-
thy peers. Let’s say the number of trustworthy peers (Twp) is equivalent to the number of untrustworthy peers (Uwp) in the
network. Thus, the population of nodes in the network comprises half Twp and another half Uwp. With the personalisation
feature of the SeCuRE trust model, out of these Uwp from the conventional model, can be further divided into about 29
categories of untrustworthiness considering the S , C , Q , R , Cr element and its combinations thereof. If each peer is only
concerned with one category of a node being malicious out of these 29 categories, then the other 28 categories are regarded
as trustworthy by the peers. As a result, the probability of a new peer to encounter a malicious peer is reduced from 50%
to (1/29 × 50%) ≈ 1.74%. To generalise, the likelihood of a peer to interact with a malicious peer will be: (the number of
categories considered as malicious by a peer/all categories)× percentage of malicious peers by conventional model. 
B. Network policy
The notion of reputation is a proper means for discovering low-performing peers that fail to provide reasonable services
and thus avoids the risk of the querying peers. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that the reputation values are safely
stored by each peer in the network. Having described our reputation and trust model, it is important to consider the
policy to promote the fairness among high and low-performing peers. Our policy manages the incentive given to the peers in
the most effective way. The absence of such policy will affect the stability of the entire system due to the undesirable
circumstances whereby the high-performing peers are getting overloaded by serving more low-performing peers and yet
they receive equal beneﬁt from the P2P system regardless of the contribution they have made. This kind of undesirable
situation leads the high-performing peers to lower their performance, while the low-performing ones are encouraged to
keep their performance at the same level and continue to free-ride without contributing any resources. As time goes by, the
number of free riders may be increasing, and eventually this may lead the system to collapse [8]. Thus, it is imperative for
each peer to voluntarily contribute resources [28,29].
Thus, to address this, we propose to apply tit-for-tat policy in conjunction with our reputation model. In this tit-for-tat
policy the high performers will be ensured to receive high quality services, and similarly the low performers will be getting
low quality services. The quality of services relates to the resource assignment given from a peer to the requesting peer,
which can be in the form of upstream bandwidth, Central Processing Unit (CPU) cycles, priority queue, and so on.
In our system, the aggregate value of service Tsi is used to indicate the reputation level of pi . Thus, if pi receives
a request, qi from pi in the queue, it will ﬁrstly check the Tsi in pi ’s reputation repository. If pi is considered a high-
performer (i.e. Tsi  80), the qi is shifted to the high-performers cluster at the front of the queue, and this cluster will be
assigned the highest bandwidth. Secondly, p j will check each element in Tsi and if either of C or R is rated very low (i.e.
 20), p j will discard the request from the queue. These two elements of reputation are considerably non-negotiable in the
system.
Those peers with moderate Ts will be served after all the high-performer peers have been completed. They will be
served in the sequential basis following their Ts rate. This checking process is done for all the peers. For peers requesting
trustworthy recommendation of another peer, the requests will be queued in the order of their Tc . If the Tc rate is not
available, then Ts rate will be used as an alternative. A new comer in the network will be ﬁrstly given a high default Ts and
Tc value by its queried peer, which allow them to be considered as high-performing peers. If the new peer is a free-rider,
the value will be reduced each time this peer requests for a service from the same queried peer. The second time request
will place them in the middle-level performing peers and the third time will put them in the low-level performers. Thus,
the reputation will be in decreasing order (i.e. 80..60..40..20). Finally, their request will be discarded by its peer. Each peer
can set the lowest threshold value to get a request removed. It is sensible to give three opportunities for the new peer.
When a request from a new peer reaches the threshold value, the requested peer may decide to broadcast a message to
its trustworthy neighbourhood peers asking the reputation value of the new peer. If it receives a reputation value from
multiple peers, it implies that the new peer is not a free-rider and the requested peer will assign the ﬁnal value based on
the aggregation value obtained from the neighbourhood peers. However, if it turns out to be null, the new peer is apparently
a free-rider and deserve to be removed from the queue. This can only be avoided if the new peer is an active peer and so
the default trust value will eventually be replaced with an actual value assigned by its associated peers.
The main reasons of this new peer policy are (i) to prevent free-riders, (ii) to avoid misinterpretation of the new peer
towards intermediate peer, and (iii) to understand the service obtained as a high performer and therefore serve as an
encouragement to achieve the same. The mechanism of our query processing policy is described in Algorithm 1. This policy
may also suspend the peers from the network that have reputation values below a certain threshold. Speciﬁcally, peers with
low quality services continuously for a certain period. Therefore, this policy is expected to improve the quality offered to
the remaining peers, and so is the sustainability of the system.
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Input: peer i (pi ), request j (r j ), peer j (p j ), service trust value of peer j (Ts j ), credibility trust value of peer j (Tc j ), a new peer (pnew).
Procedure:
1. pi ordered its queue based on the reputation value of each peers in the queue
2. pi receives r j , checks the Ts j value. If Ts j (not found), Tc j is used. Else p j := pnew
3. If (p j := pnew)
pi checks if any records of p j previous requests
If (found)
Assign the new Ts j or Tc j value
Else
The default high-performer value is assigned
4. If (p j := pnew and (Ts j or Tc j  20))
pi broadcasts a message to check the reputation value of p j from pi ’s trustworthy neighbour peers
If (no value received)
pi discards r j from the queue
Else
pi assigns an aggregate value to Ts j
5. If (Ts j > 0)
pi checks if C or R element of Ts j is  20
If (found)
pi discards r j from the queue
Else
pi puts p j in the queue based on the Ts j or Tc j
End Procedure
Table 2
Stage 1 of the proposed trustworthy management scheme.
Direct peer Stage 1
Trustworthy peer Respond from unknown peer: Score (−1/0/1)
3.2. Trust management scheme
Our SeCuRE trust model has assigned a credibility parameter for peer’s trustworthiness about recommending other peers.
However, it is also important to make sure that we are not misled by the recommendation and perform transactions or
assign ‘bad’ peers as relay peers in disseminating messages. Thus, our trust management scheme is designed to detect ‘bad
mouthing peer’ and collaborative-based malicious peers. This case is mainly crucial when interacting with new or unknown
indirect peers where we do not have prior transactions or interactions with. It is assumed that each peer has kept a list of
its direct peers and the SeCuRE value of these peers based on the prior interaction experiences. In a situation where we
are required to interact with unknown peers whereby the trustworthiness of these peers are unknown to us and none of
our trustworthy direct peers are able to provide recommendation about them or we do not want to waste our resources by
checking each of our trustworthy direct peers if they have earlier had interactions with them, then it is essential to have
preliminary assessment of these peers. To address this, we will perform three stages of assessment as a means to detect
if these unknown peers are trustworthy or untrustworthy peers. The untrustworthy peers are classiﬁed into two categories
namely (i) malicious and (ii) collaborative-based malicious peers. In order to perform our method, we need to use the
identity of our direct peers, which can be trustworthy direct peers and untrustworthy peers in the surrounding area. The
following describes further details on the three stages approach.
Stage 1: We are going to use identity of a trustworthy direct peer and request the unknown peer to provide recommendation
about this peer. There are three possible responds in this case namely good, neutral or bad. Neutral may also mean unable
to provide any recommendations, which by default we will consider neutral as malicious peer in order to be on the safe
side. We use scoring-based technique for each category of respond such as ‘Good peer’ (Score = 1), ‘Neutral’ (Score = 0),
‘Bad peer’ (Score = −1). The responds of the unknown peer will be translated into these scores. This stage is mainly used
to determine ‘Good’ or ‘Non-malicious peer’. It will look like Table 2.
Stage 2: In this second stage, we use the identity of an untrustworthy direct peer and request the unknown peer to provide
recommendation about this peer. Likewise, there are three possible responds in this case and the responds of the unknown
peer will be translated into these scores. This stage is needed to determine malicious peer and will look like Table 3.
Stage 3: In this last stage, we would consider the ﬁnal score from the two stages as follows: Final Score = Score from Stage 2−
Score from Stage 1. The result helps to determine the classiﬁcation of the peers such as shown in Table 4.
We understand that it is also important not to maintain the same order each time. Thus, the order of the two stages can
be done in a random basis, which means it can be Stage 1 then followed by Stage 2 as described earlier or it is possible to
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Stage 2 of the proposed trustworthy management scheme.
Direct peer Stage 2
Malicious peer Respond from unknown peer: Score (−1/0/1)
Table 4
Stage 3 of the proposed trustworthy management scheme.
Stage 1 Stage 2 Final Score Category
1 0 1 −2 = malicious and collaborative-based peer
1 −1 2 −1 = malicious with possibly collaborative-based peer
1 1 0 0 = malicious but non-collaborative peer
0 1 −1 Both 0s= unclassiﬁed with default category “malicious”
0 −1 1 1 = non-malicious
0 0 0 2 = non-malicious
−1 0 −1
−1 1 −2
−1 −1 0
Table 5
Stage 3 of the proposed trustworthy management scheme with different order.
Stage 1 Stage 2 Final Score Category
−1 0 −1 −1 = non-malicious
−1 1 −2 −2 = non-malicious
−1 −1 0 0 = malicious but non-collaborative peer
0 1 −1 Both 0s= unclassiﬁed with default category “malicious”
0 −1 1 1 = malicious with possibly collaborative-based peer
0 0 0 2 = malicious and collaborative-based peer
1 0 1
1 −1 2
1 1 0
have Stage 2 followed by Stage 1. This will prevent the malicious peer to fake the respond. When the order is swapped from
Stage 2 to Stage 1, the interpretation of the peers based on the score should be adjusted accordingly as shown in Table 5.
This process can be done in one interaction. For example, a peer x queries an unknown peer y over the credibility of
direct peer i, and peer j it can be represented as follows:
Qx→y[Cr]Tpi ,pj (10)
The respond from peer y can be given as follows:
Ry→x
[
Cr(pi),Cr(p j)
]
(11)
4. Trustworthy-based estafet multi-point relaying (TEMPR): Proposed data broadcast model
The trust model that we have described earlier in Section 3 serves as the basis to determine the trustworthiness of
the neighbour peers. We only assign the message to the most trustworthy neighbour peers. The associated trust value is
determined from the aggregate of service and recommendation trustworthy value, To. Fig. 5 illustrates how the broadcasting
peer retrieves the overall reliability of a peer.
Based on these values, the broadcasting peer is able to determine the most trustworthy neighbour peers as relay peers
to broadcast the message to the leaf peers. Our approach to broadcast messages is distinguished from the earlier approach
in a way that, rather than each neighbour peer broadcasts a message to the second level neighbour, our scheme applies a
trustworthy-based estafet multi-point relaying (TEMPR) mechanism. In this scheme, the broadcast peer will select the most
trustworthy peers to broadcast messages but only send one message to the most trustworthy neighbour.
The most trustworthy neighbour peer will pass the message to the second most trustworthy neighbour peers in the
same level (sibling peers) and so on and so forth. At the same time, the broadcasting peer has also determined its leaf
peers and assigns a speciﬁc relay peer (trustworthy neighbour peer) to forward the message to. Each trustworthy relay
peer is responsible for all the deﬁned peers within its sub-network. The broadcasting peer will determine the threshold
trustworthy level to satisfy with and select the neighbour peers that meet the threshold to forward the message and order
them in descending list. The message will only be passed to the peer with the highest trust value which subsequently with
the instructions from the broadcasting peer (pb) shall relay the message to its sibling peers following the identity peers
given in the list as well as to its sub-network peers. Similarly, the leaf peers to receive the message has been given in the
list and the selected peers will be responsible to forward the message to its sibling peers. The proposed TEMPR scheme is
depicted in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. Trustworthy-based estafet multi-point relaying (TEMPR) – a new scheme.
In contrast to the TBB and MPR scheme [6] in which the broadcasting peer needs to individually assign a speciﬁc relay
peer (trustworthy neighbour peer) to its sub-network peers, the broadcast peer in the TEMPR only needs to deﬁne the
relay peers and the leaf peers, who are intended to receive the message. Each of the relay peers has the knowledge of
its sub-network peers; hence the assignment from the broadcast peer is no longer necessary. In order to avoid message
redundancies, the relay peers will capture its sub-network peers and remove them from the list before passing on the
message to its sibling peer. Thus, any relay peer will not send any message to a child peer that may be covered by two
relay peers.
The broadcasting peer determines the threshold of trustworthiness to satisfy and select the neighbour peers that meet
the threshold to forward the message and order them in the descending list. The message will only be passed on to the
peer with the highest trust value, who will subsequently relay the message to its sibling peers following the identity peers
given in the list as well as to its sub-network peers. Similarly, the leaf peers to receive the message has been given in the
list and the selected peers will be responsible to forward the message to its sibling peers.
Let’s say the broadcasting peer, pb , has a number of trustworthy neighbour peers p1, . . . , pi in R(pb), R(pb) ∈ N1(pb),
and the associate trustworthiness, To−1 . . . To−k in To(pi). pb will select rank in descending order and broadcast the message
to the ﬁrst relay peer in the list, which has the highest To ,{
To := Tomax, iff
(
To > ∀To ∈ (To(pi) − 1)
)}
For neighbour peers in N1(pb) that are not part of the relay peers, NR(pb), pb will send a simpler format of the data
packet without any peers listed in the packet since these peers in NR(pb) are not supposed to forward the message. Note
that N1(pb) := R(pb) ∪ NR(pb).
Subsequently, pb transmits the message together with the list of other trustworthy peers to be broadcast to. As pb is
not aware of the trustworthiness of its leaf peers to receive the message, it relies on its trustworthy neighbour peer to
determine the trust level of its leaf peers based on the direct or indirect interactions with the leaf peers. For instance,
based on the list, R1 has (C1,C2,C3) child peers to receive the message, R1 will check the trustworthiness of these peers
based on R1’s interaction records with these peers. It will only forward the message to one of these leaf peers that it ﬁnds
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Input: broadcasting peer (pb), a group of ﬁrst level neighbour peers (N1), a group of second level neighbour peer (N2), a set of relay peers (R), a set of
non-relay neighbour peers (NR), a set of leaf peers (L), a set of non-relay leaf peers (NRL), overall trust value of the neighbour peers (To).
Procedure:
1. pb selects a set of trustworthy neighbour peers, i.e. {pi ∈ N1 | To(pi) α} where 0  α 100. α gives a threshold value on the trustworthiness. If
To(pi) is larger than or equal to α, pb recognises the neighbour peer pi to be trustworthy and considered as one of the relay peers. Otherwise, pi is
considered untrustworthy. The selected neighbour peers from N1 will become the relay peers and collated in R(pb).
2. pb speciﬁes the leaf peers, L(pb) from N2(pb) to receive the message from the neighbour peers, R(pb).
3. pb arranges the list of relay peers R(pb) in descending order of their trustworthiness and another list contains the non-relay peers in NR(pb).
4. pb transmits the packet containing R(pb), L(pb) and the relevant messages to its most trustworthy peer, pi ∈ R(pb).
5. Each selected relay peer, pi in R(pb) who receives the message will then retrieve the sibling peers (peers of the same level) to pass the message to as
well the leaf peers under its sub-network, S(pi). Their identity and its child peers will be taken out from the message before it is passed on the sibling
peer.
6. The relay peer, R(pi) will check its interaction records with its child peers, S(pi). Based on the record, the relay peer is able to determine the
trustworthiness of (possibly) each peer in its sub-network. Subsequently, the relay peer will rank its sub-network peers in descending order according
to their trust value. The leaf peer with the highest trustworthy value will be the ﬁrst leaf peer to receive the message within the sub-network. The leaf
peers that are not trusted will be listed in NRL and the message will be broadcast separately.
7. The trustworthy leaf peer will then relay the message to its sibling peer following the order given in the list from its parent peer.
End Procedure
to be the most trustworthy and pass it along to the other leaf peers. Those leaf peers in the list that are not considered
trustworthy by R1 will be broadcast separately without any relaying instruction. The format of the messaging data packet
can be deﬁned as follows: {〈R1, R2, . . . , Rm〉〈C1,C2, . . . ,Cn〉: message}. The 〈R1, R2, . . . , Rm〉 indicates a group of relay peers,
whilst the 〈C1,C2, . . . ,Cn〉 denotes the child or leaf peers. The message, which constitutes the disseminated information
from the broadcast peer is given at the end of the packet as proceeded by double colon ‘:’ sign.
For example, let us say the broadcast peer is going to broadcast a message via trustworthy relay peers 〈R1, R2〉 and the
recipient or leaf peers to receive the message are 〈C1,C2,C3,C4,C5〉. In this example, R1 = {C1,C2,C3}, R2 = {C3,C4,C5}.
R1 is the ﬁrst relay peer to receive the message from the broadcast peer. Upon receiving the message, R1 will capture its
identity and check if any of its child peers are in the intended recipients. When R1 ﬁnds that {C1,C2,C3} are in the list, it
will capture these three child peers from the list and send the modiﬁed packet to the next relay peer, or R2 in this case.
R2 will subsequently receive the packet containing {〈R2〉〈C4,C5〉: message}. Similar to R1, R2 will send the message to the
child peers belongs to its sub-network and the message stops as R2 is the last relay peer in the network.
The leaf peer C1 will receive the message, take out its own identity and forward the rest to the next peer in the list. The
revised packet looks like as follows: {〈C2,C3〉: message}, and the process continues. This TEMPR model requires a minimum
transmission and scheduling cost to disseminate a message. Algorithm 2 describes a complete procedure of our TEMPR.
The transmission cost of each node based on three schemes can be deﬁned as follows: Let’s denote the broadcast peer
pb , a relay peer R(pi), a non-relay peer NR(pi), a leaf peer L(pi), a sub-network of R(pi) as S(pi), the non-relay leaf peers
(NRL(pi)) and the required transmission power (Tp). The transmission cost (Tc) is classiﬁed based on the three roles of the
peers namely the broadcast peer, the relay peer and the leaf peer.
Pure ﬂooding scheme:
Tc(pb) = Tp×
(∑
pi ∈ N1(pb)
)
(12)
Tc(R(pi)) = Tp×
( y∑
x=1
px ∈ N2(pb)
)
(13)
The y notation in formula (13) signiﬁes the number of the leaf peers that each neighbour peer can cover. With pure
ﬂooding, this parameter is not regulated but the coverage number of leaf peers for each neighbour peer can be assumed the
same.
TBB scheme:
Tc(pb) = Tp×
(∑
pi ∈ N1(pb)
)
(14)
Tc(R(pi)) = Tp×
(∑
S(pi)
)
(15)
Proposed TEMPR:
Tc(pb) = Tp×
(
1+
∑
NR(pb)
)
(16)
Tc(R(pi)) = (TpR(pi)→R(pj)) + (TpR(pi)→L(pi)) +
(
Tp×
∑
NRL(pi)
)
(17)
Tc(L(pi)) = TpL(pi)→L(pj) ≈ Tp (18)
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Transmission cost comparison.
Transmission cost (W )
Broadcast peer (pb) Relay peer (R(pi)) Leaf peer (L(p j))
Pureﬂooding 600 800 –
TBB 600 600 –
TEMPR 300 400 100
Lemma 2. The transmission cost of the broadcast peer, pb, in the proposed TEMPR is < TBB/pure ﬂooding scheme:[
Pureﬂooding(Tc(pb)) ∨ TBB(Tc(pb))
]
> proposed_TEMPR(Tc(pb))
Proof. The non-relay peers in the proposed TEMPR is a subset of the N1(pb) peers, NR(pb) ⊂ N1(pb). Realistically, the
percentage of malicious peers in a P2P system is lower than the percentage of good peers [11], so
∑
NR(pb) <
∑
R(pb).
Thus, given that NR(pb) ⊂ N1(pb) and ∑NR(pb) < ∑ R(pb), in any case, Pureﬂooding(Tc(pb)) ∨ TBB(Tc(pb)) is always >
than the proposed_TEMPR(Tc(pb)). 
Lemma 3. Similar to the Tc(pb) , the transmission cost of the relay peer, TC(R(pi)), of the proposed TEMPR is  TBB < pure ﬂooding
scheme, such that
Pureﬂooding(Tc(R(pi))) > TBB(Tc(R(pi))) proposed_TEMPR(Tc(R(pi)))
Proof. The pure ﬂooding scheme simply disseminates messages to the leaf peers where the number of leaf peers to send to
is based on the transmission range of each N1(pi) peer or can be represented as y. In contrast, the TBB scheme regulates
the leaf peers as a sub-group of each N1(pi) peer, so that it eliminates redundancy. As such,
∑
S(pi) < y.
Therefore, Pureﬂooding(Tc(R(pi))) > TBB(Tc(R(pi))). The subgroup of each N1(pi) peer in the TBB scheme is the superset
of the non-relay leaf peers (NRL(pi)) in the proposed TEMPR scheme, S(pi) ⊃ NRL(pi). As a matter of fact, the number of
trustworthy peers should be larger than the malicious peers [11]. Thus, (
∑
S(pi) − ∑NRL(pi)) > ∑NRL(pi). This shows
that:
T C
(
R(pi)
)≈ {TBB(Tc(R(pi))) > proposed_TEMPR(Tc(R(pi))), if ((∑ S(pi) −∑NRL(pi)) > 2)
TBB(Tc(R(pi))) ≈ proposed_TEMPR(Tc(R(pi))), otherwise
This proves:
Pureﬂooding(Tc(R(pi))) > TBB(Tc(R(pi))) proposed_TEMPR(Tc(R(pi))) 
Example. Consider a scenario of a broadcast peer, pb with N1(pb) and N2(pb) is 6 and 24, respectively. The R(pb) = 4,
NR(pb) = 2, S(pi) = 6, NLR(pi) = 2, the number of coverage for each neighbour peer, y = 8 and the transmission power =
100 Wattage (W ). Based on this example, we can calculate the transmission cost of each peer as given in Table 6.
As shown in Table 6, the proposed TEMPR scheme offers the least transmission cost among the three. The transmission
cost in this context can be considered as the transmission power like we shown in the example or bandwidth consumption
or any other associated transmission overhead. In term of the latency cost, the broadcasting peer is able to specify the speed
parameter in our trust model. Thus, for message, which requires fast dissemination, the broadcast peer will strictly select
the relay peer based on the trustworthiness as well as the transmission speed criteria given in the model.
Additionally, the proposed TEMPR scheme can be equipped with the priority-based scheduling method to dynamically
adjust the order of the message dissemination based on the deﬁned priority. It is common that one or more particular
node(s) in the network are meant to receive or requires receipt of the message at the earliest possible time. This adaptive
method will override the order initially constructed by our model that is based on the level of trustworthiness. Fig. 7
illustrates the scheduling method, and the associated procedure is shown in Algorithm 3.
5. Performance evaluation
This section studies the performance of the proposed TEMPR scheme and its comparison with the pure ﬂooding [9] and
the earlier trustworthy-based MPR method or TBB [6,27]. The analysis includes power consumption and bandwidth usage of
each category of node in the P2P network namely the broadcast peer, the ﬁrst neighbour/relay peer and the second level
neighbour/leaf peer. In the context of limited resources in P2P systems, any possible burden to the peer’s resources should
be made as minimum as possible. Therefore, eﬃciency is a critical measure. Likewise, we also perform trustworthy analysis
of the proposed trust model for classifying trustworthy, malicious, and collaborative-based malicious peers in the network.
This also includes a comparison with a conventional trust management scheme.
We divide our investigations into two sub-sections, namely (i) eﬃciency, (ii) trustworthy analysis.
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Algorithm 3: Scheduling method
Input: a list ordered peers based on trustworthiness (Initial), set of priority peers (Priority).
Output: a new schedule (Scheduled).
Procedure:
1. For i = 1 to the number of peers in Priority
2. Retrieve the ﬁrst peer in the list
3. Check if peer has a parent node
4. If (found)
5. Retrieve the parent node
6. Insert the parent node in the Scheduled
7. Insert the peer in the Scheduled
8. Else
9. Insert the peer in the Scheduled
10. Next
11. For i = 1 to No. of peers in Initial
12. Check if peer is already listed in Scheduled
13. If (not found)
14. Insert the peer in the Scheduled
15. Next
End Procedure
5.1. Eﬃciency performance
This sub-section studies the eﬃciency of each peer while performing data dissemination in P2P networks. According to
Imielinski et al. [12], a device with a Hobbit chip (AT&T) requires about 250 mW power consumption during active mode,
and 50 μW during power saving mode. For simplicity, in this evaluation, other activities and components that require power
consumption are disregarded, and assumed that 250 mW relates to the total transmission power consumption. We assume
that the percentage of malicious peers, in a P2P system, is lower than the percentage of good peers. This assumption is
realistic as the basis on which peer-to-peer systems can work [11]. Table 7 shows the parameters of concern.
A. Broadcast peer
This case aims to discover the performance cost of the broadcast peer, pb . The packet size for the TEMPR scheme is
slightly larger from the other two schemes due to the inclusion of the relaying peers in the packet. It is assumed that the
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Parameters of concern.
Parameters Value
# of broadcast peer (pb) 1
# of ﬁrst level neighbour peers (N1(pb)) 30–170
# of second level neighbour peers (N2(pb)) or leaf peers (L(pb)) 150–850
# good peers as relay peers (R(pb)) 75% of #(N1(pb))
# malicious peers as non-relay peers (NR(pb)) 25% of #(N1(pb))
# malicious peers as non-relay leaf peers (NRL(pi)) 25% of #(L(pb))
# of maximum peer coverage (y) 30
Transmission power 0.25 W
Packet size 50–500 Bytes
Message size 20 Bytes
Fig. 8. Power consumption of the broadcast peer.
Fig. 9. Bandwidth usage of the broadcast peer.
packet size for the TEMPR ranges from 150–500 Bytes and 50–225 Bytes for the other two schemes with the increase of
25 Bytes for each population increase in the given studies.
As shown in Fig. 8, the transmission cost in respect to the power consumption of the pure ﬂooding and the TBB scheme
is the same. This is due to the same number of transmission and packet size required by the broadcast peer to disseminate
the message. The proposed TEMPR scheme incurs the lowest power transmission cost among the three since the number of
transmission is less than the others.
Similarly, in Fig. 9, the bandwidth cost of the pure ﬂooding and the TBB scheme is considerably the same and so is
counted as one. The proposed TEMPR scheme consumes the least bandwidth usage despite its larger packet size to broadcast.
The driving factor of this is the fact that the number of transmissions required by the proposed TEMPR scheme is much less
than the other two.
B. First neighbour/relay peer
In this case, we study the performance cost of the ﬁrst neighbour, N1(pi)/relay peer, R(pi) upon receiving the message
from the broadcast peer. Fig. 10 depicts the power transmission cost of the three schemes. As the number of transmission
of the N1(pi)/R(pi) is relatively constant based on the y and S(pi) values, we can obtain the average consumption of the
schemes.
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Fig. 11. Bandwidth usage of the N1(pi)/R(pi) peer: (a) Pure ﬂooding vs. proposed TEMPR scheme, (b) TBB vs. proposed TEMPR scheme, (c) Pure ﬂooding vs.
TBB vs. proposed TEMPR scheme.
Fig. 12. Power and bandwidth usage of the N2(pi)/L(pi) peer: Proposed TEMPR scheme.
From Fig. 10, we can see that pure ﬂooding offers the largest power utilisation than the others since the N1(pi) peer in
the pure ﬂooding scheme simply disseminates the message following its maximum coverage in y value. The TBB and the
proposed TEMPR introduces a similar power utilisation with the TEMPR slightly outperforms the former. However, it should
be noted that TBB performance is dependent on the number of peers in its sub-network. As opposed to this, the TEMPR
scheme is more scalable whereby the number of transmission required is constant, given one transmission to the sibling
peer and another one to the leaf peer.
In Fig. 11(a), we can see the bandwidth usage of the N1(pi)/R(pi) peer from the pure ﬂooding and the proposed TEMPR
scheme. The larger the transmission, the more bandwidth is required. This reﬂects to the bandwidth usage due to the
pure ﬂooding scheme which offers an increasingly higher consumption than the proposed TEMPR. On the other hand, the
bandwidth usage of the TBB scheme is relatively close to the proposed TEMPR given in Fig. 11(b). Again, the bandwidth
usage of the TBB scheme follows the number of peers in its sub-network to receive the message. Fig. 11(c) shows the
bandwidth cost the three schemes together.
C. Second neighbour/leaf peer
The main difference between the three schemes is that the leaf peer in pure ﬂooding and TBB schemes does not incur
any power or bandwidth cost to the network. The proposed TEMPR scheme requires the trustworthy leaf peer to relay the
message to its sibling peer. However, the overhead cost is very little and ﬁxed with only once-off transmission for each leaf
peer. In this case, we can see in Fig. 12, the average bandwidth and power utilisation of each trustworthy leaf peer in the
P2P network following the proposed TEMPR scheme.
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5.2. Trustworthy analysis
In this section, we measure the performance of our trust management model to detect trustworthy, malicious and
collaborative-based malicious peers. Two cases are introduced; the ﬁrst case relates to the naïve case, whereby all the peers
in the network have the same set of interactions history with other peers. The second case constitutes a more realistic case,
whereby each peer has a different set of interactions history.
A. Case 1
This case aims to measure the performance of the proposed model in an ideal case. For comparison, we use a conven-
tional model [26,32], which relies on the collective responds of the peers in the network to determine the trustworthiness
of the requested peers. However, this conventional model is not designed for collaborative peers. We classify the correct-
ness of the model in terms of true positive/negative, and false positive/negative. The number of the peers in the network
ranges from 100 to 2000. We run our experiment for ﬁve times and derive the average result accordingly. Out of the total
number of peers in the network, we have 70% trustworthy peers, 30% malicious peers and 30% of the malicious peers are
collaborative-based malicious peers. Fig. 13 shows the result of our trustworthy model. The results indicate that our model
is able to perform very well in this case, which means that each classiﬁed peers in the network are detected correctly by
the model. Hence, we have 100% true positive for detecting trustworthy, malicious and collaborative malicious peers.
Likewise, Fig. 14 depicts the case for the conventional model, and Table 8 shows the precision of the model. The results of
our experiment using a conventional model with 100 peers in the network show 0.35 false positive for detecting trustworthy
peers, 0.035 for malicious peers and 1 false negative for collaborative malicious peers. The false positive for trustworthy
peers means that there are more number of peers detected are trustworthy than the actual numbers. This is undesirable
as it signiﬁes that the bad-mouthing peers of the malicious peers are able to successfully mislead the classiﬁcation, which
may endanger other peers. In contrast, the false positive for malicious peers signiﬁes that there is a larger number of peers
classiﬁed malicious than the actual number. This is not of much concern since this can be considered as a safety measure.
The false negative rate for detecting collaborative malicious peers is due to the fact that the conventional model is not able
to detect such peers, instead the conventional model has a number of ‘undetermined peers’, whereby the classiﬁcation of
the peers under this category is unknown. The same trend applies to the other experiments with 1000 and 2000 number
of peers.
B. Case 2
This second case relates to a more advanced case, which is closer to the real-world situation. As stated earlier, each peer
in this case is equipped with different set of interactions history with other peers. We assign the interactions history to
each peer in a random basis. Thus, a trustworthy peer would return a ‘0’ when the requested peer is not in their historical
list. This peer with ‘0’ is classiﬁed as malicious by the proposed model, and placed under ‘undetermined peers’ by the
conventional model. Additionally, the malicious and collaborative-based malicious peers are able to perform a trick using a
random method, which may mislead the requester about the true nature of the peer. Similar to Case 1, we run ﬁve iterations
in our experiments and obtain the average result. The number of peers adopts the same range from 100 to 2000 peers. The
distribution of the trustworthy, malicious and collaborative malicious peers remains the same as Case 1.
In Fig. 15, we can see the results of our proposed model in classifying peers. Table 9 summarises these precision of the
model. As shown in Table 9, for 100 peers, the proposed model incurs 0.51 false negative rates for detecting trustworthy
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Table 8
Case 1: Conventional model.
Conventional model Case 1: Naïve case
Actual vs. detected peers No. of peers: 100 No. of peers: 1000 No. of peers: 2000
False positive False negative False positive False negative False positive False negative
Trustworthy peers 0.35 0.24 0.24
Malicious peers 0.035 0.26 0.27
Collaborative malicious peers 1 1 1
peers, 0.67 false positive of malicious peers and 0.17 false negative for collaborative malicious peers. Firstly, this result
implies that the proposed model has detected less number of trustworthy peers than the actual number. This is part of
the precaution in the model, which classify undetermined peers as malicious peers. Secondly, the proposed model detects
a larger number of malicious peers than actually is in the network. Thirdly, we have detected a slightly less number of
collaborative peers than the actual number is. This is due to the random trick of the malicious peers, when the requested
peer is not in their historical list, but our model is still able to classify them as malicious only peers. The same trend of
results applies for the increased number of peers in the network.
Moving on, in Fig. 16, we can see the performance of the conventional model in classifying peers under the same
circumstances deﬁned for Case 2. Table 10 indicates the precision of this model. From Table 10, we can clearly see that the
precision is dominated by false negative rate throughout the entire tests. This is particularly interesting as false negative
for trustworthy and malicious peer detection constitutes undesirable performance. The false negative for trustworthy peers
implies that there is larger number of trustworthy peers than what is detected, and the same case applies for the malicious
peers. The less number of malicious peers detected causes a serious threat for the system as there are malicious peers in
the network that are being around undetected. Similar to Case 1, the false negative rate of detecting collaborative malicious
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Table 9
Case 2: Proposed model.
Proposed model Case 2: Advanced case
Actual vs. detected peers No. of peers: 100 No. of peers: 1000 No. of Peers: 2000
False positive False negative False positive False negative False positive False negative
Trustworthy peers 0.51 0.54 0.52
Malicious peers 0.67 0.65 0.64
Collaborative malicious peers 0.17 0.15 0.12
peers is due to the fact that the conventional model is unable to classify these peers. These peers together with other peers
that the model is unable to classify are placed under ‘undetermined peers’ category.
6. Concluding remark
In this paper, we have presented a novel trustworthy-based eﬃcient data dissemination approach for P2P interactions in
resource-constrained wireless environments that aims to enhance the reliability and eﬃciency of the peers performing pull
and push interactions in the network. Our trust model is equipped with a personalisation feature whereby four different
elements of service trustworthiness, namely SpEed, Correctness, qUality, and Risk-freE (SeCuRE), are considered. Together with
peer’s credibility performance and the deﬁned network policy serve as the basis to provide a comprehensive reputation
model. This model is exercised in conjunction with our trust management scheme. This scheme is designed to detect
malicious and collaborative malicious peers that will potentially ruin the network by providing misleading information.
Based on the knowledge of trustworthiness from the proposed model, the broadcast peer is able to perform message
disseminations in the most reliable manner. To ensure eﬃciency of P2P data dissemination process in limited resource
environments, we have designed a new approach named trustworthy-based estafet multi-point relays (TEMPR) model. The
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Table 10
Case 2: Conventional model.
Conventional model Case 2: Advanced case
Actual vs. detected peers No. of peers: 100 No. of peers: 1000 No. of peers: 2000
False positive False negative False positive False negative False positive False negative
Trustworthy peers 0.11 0.43 0.03
Malicious peers 0.13 0.43 0.18
Collaborative malicious peers 1 1 1
performance of our proposed TEMPR model to disseminate messages has been analysed and compared with the other two
existing schemes (i.e. pure ﬂooding and TBB schemes). It is shown that our TEMPR scheme outperforms the other schemes in
respect to the power utilisation and bandwidth usage. It is also noteworthy that TEMPR scheme incurs additional cost for the
leaf peer to disseminate the message to its sibling peers, which are not applicable in the other two schemes. However, the
associated cost is considerably very little compared to the eﬃciency beneﬁt that the scheme offers to the entire network.
Moreover, this scheme offers ﬂexibility to extend the number of level of neighbour peers that a broadcast peer may have in
the network.
In regards to the reliability measure of our trust model, we have performed precision analysis against a conventional
model in terms of false negative/positive classiﬁcation. From the experiments, we can summarise that the proposed trust
model is robust enough to provide reliable classiﬁcation of peers in the network. The model has shown to be able to
minimise the risks of misclassiﬁcation. To conclude, our proposed TEMPR model leads to signiﬁcant eﬃciency and reliability
for performing trustworthy analysis and data dissemination in resource-constrained P2P networks.
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